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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One might imagine that an exchange rate left unchanged for 11 years would not generate 
much interest. Yet toward the end of 2004 The Economist magazine (01/10/2004) 
observed that issues surrounding China’s pegged exchange rate regime had become 
amongst the hottest topics in international finance. Since late 2000, much of the interest 
has been prompted by speculation that China would revalue its currency. The chief 
impetus for this speculation has been an accusation emanating from U.S government 
circles that the dollar peg is a prominent cause of the U.S trade deficit with China. The 
contention is that China’s currency, the Renminbi (RMB), is pegged at an undervalued 
rate and is a source of unfair advantage for Chinese exporters. Amongst members of U.S 
Congress such complaints have reached fever-pitched proportions. There is currently a 
bill set for debate before July 2005 that proposes a 27.5 percent tariff be imposed on all 
Chinese imports unless the dollar peg is adjusted within six months. In a report to 
Congress in May 2005, Secretary of the U.S Treasury John Snow described China’s 
exchange rate policies as being "highly distortionary" and if left unaltered, would lead to 
China being labeled an exchange manipulator under the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988. Secretary Snow stated in the report that the U.S 
government was calling on China to switch to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
European Union (EU) officials and the G-7 group have echoed this call as the Euro in 
particular is seen as having been forced to bear the brunt of the dollar’s depreciation in 
recent years appreciating from €1.132:$US1 in January 2002 to €0.748:$US1 at the end 
of 2004. Between 2002 and 2004 the EU’s trade deficit with China more than doubled 
(compared with the U.S trade deficit with China which increased by a little over one half) 
(WSJ, 17/05/2005). In the first half of 2005 trade disputes in textiles became particularly 
prominent, with both the U.S and E.U erecting punitive measures in May to slow a surge 
in Chinese imports that resulted from the phasing out of global textiles quotas at the end 
of 2004. Calls for greater exchange rate flexibility have also come from outside of 
government circles by senior economists in the IMF (Rajan and Subramanian, 2004; 
Prasad, et al., 2005) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (IHT, 28/05/2005) and 
other prominent international economists based in central banks, research institutes and 
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academia such as Roberts and Tyers (2003), Bergsten (2003), Eichengreen (2004), 
Goldstein and Lardy (2004), Bernanke (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005) and Frankel 
(2005).  
 
Policy-makers in China have referred to a more flexible exchange rate regime as being a 
longer-term goal and not one that is on the immediate policy agenda. The only 
concession to date has been a 2 percent revaluation in July 2005 and linking the value of 
the RMB to a basket of currencies rather than solely the U.S dollar. As outside pressure 
has increased for greater flexibility, so to has the rhetoric coming from China. Wu 
Xiaoling, Vice-Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), has stated that, "If the 
United States had not created this environment, the reforms would probably have 
happened more quickly than people predicted" and that U.S pressure to appreciate the 
RMB is, "…detrimental to the launch of the reform on the RMB exchange rate" 
(People’s Daily, 11/05/2005; 12/05/2005). Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao followed these 
comments by stating that, "If conditions are not available, the Chinese government will 
never hastily take any action, regardless of how great the pressure from outside is" 
(People’s Daily, 13/05/2005). "Face" has clearly now become a factor in China’s 
exchange rate policy decisions and the official media has been saturated with 
commentary seeking to justify a stable peg.  
 
This paper critically comments the policy literature surrounding China’s exchange rate 
regime. Section two argues that the usual justifications given for claims that the RMB is 
undervalued and a significant cause of the U.S trade deficit are more myths than reasoned 
positions. In section three we offer our critique of the consensus position that has 
emerged which argues that China’s macroeconomic stability would now be best served 
by abandoning the peg and adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. Abandoning 
the peg would be a major policy switch and is one that is deserving of more thorough 
debate than presently exists in the literature. Section four summarizes the discussion. 
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2. COMMON MYTHS SURROUNDING CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
 
There are four common contentions, which are poorly grounded in rigorous evidence, 
that often surface in relation to China’s exchange rate regime. These include – 
 
1. China’s large and growing trade surplus with the U.S proves that the RMB is 
undervalued and that China is unfairly benefiting from trade.  
 
Economic theory does not suggest that any country will or should have balanced trade 
with each of its trading partners. This will be dynamically determined by many factors, 
principally comparative advantage considerations. Aside from U.S companies taking 
advantage of China’s cheap labor through foreign direct investment (FDI), as the 
comparative advantage of other U.S trading partners such as Japan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan has changed, so to have these countries relocated much of their labor-
intensive manufacturing base to China. This is reflected in the rising share of foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs) in China’s total exports. In 1990, FIEs accounted for less than 
15 percent of China’s exports. By 2004, their share had risen to 57 percent. Overall, 
China’s trade surplus with the U.S is largely offset by deficits with other countries, most 
notably its neighbours in the region such as Japan and South Korea. In 2004, China’s 
overall trade surplus was only $US32 billion, a modest 2 percent of GDP. This value is 
less than that routinely recorded by leading OECD trading nations (Germany’s trade 
surplus in 2003 was 6.3 percent of GDP). McKinnon (2004, p.330) makes the self-
evident but important point that as long as the U.S household savings rate remains 
unusually low and the U.S government runs a large budget deficit (3.5 percent of GDP in 
2004), “...the relatively high-savings East Asian countries are virtually forced to run 
export surpluses in order to lend their "surplus" savings to the United States - whatever 
the exchange rate regime”. It also goes without saying that were it not for previous trade 
in textiles being so distorted by quota arrangements, the U.S and the E.U would not be 
experiencing the present surge in imports of these goods.  
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A revaluation of the RMB would do little to reduce the U.S trade deficit, which in 2004 
was in the order of $US 600 billion, or 5.5 percent of GDP. China currently accounts for 
only around 10 percent of U.S total trade (and only 3 percent of E.U total trade). As a 
result, a revaluation of more drastic proportions than even the most ardent China critics 
are calling for - say to the tune of 50 percent - would only reduce the dollar’s effective 
(i.e., trade weighted) value by 5 percent. Yet between March 2002 and March 2005, the 
dollar’s real effective value fell by 27.6 percent, a time period during which the U.S trade 
deficit only widened.   
 
It is sometimes said that China adopting a more flexible exchange rate would have a 
broader impact because it would solve a coordination problem faced by other East Asian 
countries. This line of thinking argues that other East Asian countries are resistant to 
allowing their currencies to become more flexible (and presumably appreciate) without 
China doing likewise for fear that their exporters would be undercut.  There are numerous 
problems with this argument however. For one, the numbers remain small. U.S trade with 
China plus Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand still only 
amounts to 21 percent of U.S total trade. Thus, a general appreciation of East Asian 
currencies to the tune of 25 percent would only reduce the dollars effective value by 
around 5 percent.  Secondly, China’s export structure means that it does not heavily 
compete in third-country markets with many of the East Asian countries that peg to the 
dollar anyway. It should not be forgotten that it has been the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Korea and Singapore) that have been so heavily investing in China and using it 
as a base for exporting back home and abroad. Thus, this argument only holds any real 
weight in the context of ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Thailand (Weiss and 
Gao, 2003). Thirdly, this logic assumes that a coordination failure has been behind the 
reluctance of East Asian countries to adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes in the 
past. But the penchant of East Asian countries for maintaining stable exchange rates is 
more readily explained by the fact that their mutual development has been well-served by 
them (this point will be returned to later). Japan is the exception in having a more flexible 
exchange rate and the performance of its economy since abandoning its former peg has 
hardly been confidence inspiring for its neighbors.   
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U.S politicians would further do well to grasp that the dollar value of overall trade flows 
are a poor guide to the size and distribution of benefits. U.S consumers clearly benefit 
from cheap Chinese imports and Andy Xie from Morgan Stanley has also estimated that 
for each dollar of China trade the United States value-added is six to eight times China’s. 
Thus, while in 2004 the dollar value of U.S exports to China may only have been 17.7 
percent the dollar value of imports from China, the profits accruing to U.S firms are 
likely to have been in excess of those accruing to their Chinese counterparts. It is for this 
reason that U.S industry bodies are presently much quieter than in the Japan-bashing 
episodes of the early 1980s. Similarly, because many of "China’s exporters" are in fact 
foreign-invested companies, an appreciation of the RMB is not something they are keen 
on seeing. 
 
It is also worthwhile elaborating upon the unusual way in which the statistics collated by 
the U.S Department of Commerce deal with Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade. The U.S-China 
Business Council notes that these statistics count the full value of Chinese re-exports 
from Hong Kong as being Chinese exports, despite the fact that services (simple 
processing, packaging, marketing, etc) provided in Hong Kong add roughly 25 percent to 
the value of the goods originally exported from China. Meanwhile, all U.S goods 
exported to Hong Kong are counted as exports to Hong Kong, even those that are re-
exported to China. According to Nicholas Lardy from the Institute of International 
Economics, after accounting for Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade, the actual U.S trade deficit 
with China in 2003 was 11.5 percent less than that recorded by the Department of 
Commerce.  
 
2. The decline in China’s real effective exchange rate since late 2001 means the RMB 
must now be undervalued.  
 
China’s real effective exchange rate fell by 14 percent between July 2001 and January 
2005. A longer-term perspective however shows that this alone does not necessarily 
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imply the RMB is undervalued. The value of the RMB in January 2005 was the same as 
in early 1996. Moreover, this level was only about 8 percent less than at the height of the 
Asian financial crisis in the second half of 1997. It seems to have been quickly forgotten 
that at this time speculators were betting on an RMB devaluation as the prevailing 
wisdom was that the Chinese currency had been rendered decidedly overvalued. It would 
seem that economists simply do not have the means of computing equilibrium exchange 
rates with a level of confidence that makes their estimates of much use to policy makers.  
Estimates of the extent of RMB "undervaluation" seen by the authors have ranged from 
between 0 to 50 percent.  
 
3. Productivity improvements associated with China’s economic transformation mean 
that the RMB must now be undervalued.  
 
Ceteris paribus, if over the past decade productivity had grown more rapidly in China 
than in the U.S, then there would be a case for RMB appreciation. The problem though is 
that it is not at all clear that this is what has happened.  It is true that in the late 1970s and 
1980s China was able to elicit rapid productivity improvements by liberalizing its 
agricultural and non-state sectors. A study by IMF economists (Hu and Khan, 1998) 
estimated that the average annual rate of productivity growth in China over the period 
1979-1994 was 3.9 percent. This compared with around 2 percent in other Asian tigers 
(during 1966-1991) and 0.4 percent in the U.S (during 1960-1989). However, Sachs and 
Woo (1997) warned some time ago that such simple sources of productivity growth 
associated with China’s transitional economy were likely to soon be exhausted and 
continued gains would be dependent upon reforming the more challenging state-owned 
sector. Reforming the state sector has been the policy focus since the mid-1990s and 
while progress has been made, the pace has been more gradual. Anecdotally, the fact that 
higher economic growth rates over the past decade have required ever-larger shares of 
GDP be devoted to investment is hardly evocative of an economy experiencing rapid 
productivity improvements. Table 1 shows that the incremental capital output ratio in 
China has remained roughly constant since 1996. U.S productivity meanwhile picked up 
during the 1990s. China’s experience during the 1980s also shows how the impact of 
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relative productivity movements on the exchange rate can easily be swamped by other 
factors. By the time a unified exchange rate was adopted in 1994 and the official rate was 
allowed to converge to the rate in currency swap markets at the time (i.e., the market 
rate), the RMB had depreciated from RMB1.5:$US1 at the start of the reform period to 
the current RMB8.28:$US1, in spite of any relative productivity improvements.  
 
4. The surge in China’s foreign exchange reserves proves the RMB is being held at below 
equilibrium levels to boost exports.  
 
This argument fails to distinguish between the contribution of economic fundamentals to 
foreign exchange accumulation, such as the trade surplus, and speculative capital inflows 
betting on an RMB revaluation. Over the period 2001-2004, the current account surplus 
accounted for just 34 percent of total reserve accumulation while the dominant source 
was capital inflows other than FDI (Table 2). A recent study published by economists 
from the IMF (Prasad and Wei, 2005) reported that nearly 75 percent of the change in 
capital flows has come from categories of flows sensitive to market expectations on the 
future trend of the RMB/$US exchange rate, rather than the underlying fundamentals. 
Needless to say, speculative sentiments can quickly change.  
 
3. THE CASE AGAINST ABANDONING THE DOLLAR PEG 
 
Thankfully much (although certainly not all) of the commentary on China’s exchange 
rate regime that comes from sources outside the U.S Treasury does not take a strong 
stand on whether the RMB is undervalued or not. Nor does it consider the value of the 
RMB a factor that influences the U.S current account deficit in any significant way. 
Nonetheless, there is a broader point upon which a consensus is reached – that China 
ought to abandon its peg and adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime. The 
recommended form this flexibility should take varies by source, ranging from proposals 
for a simple revaluation through to a full float. The U.S Treasury predicates this policy 
standpoint upon the need to reduce "global financial imbalances". Most, however, prefer 
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to argue from the standpoint of the benefits that would accrue to China itself. While a 
variety of minor justifications are presented, the commonality that all contributors share 
is the belief that maintaining a dollar peg forces China to adopt a monetary policy 
unsuited to its current circumstances and one that threatens macroeconomic stability. It is 
said that domestic growth drivers (e.g., private consumption spending) have now 
developed to the extent that China requires greater monetary independence. But instead, 
owing largely to inflows of non-FDI capital since 2001, the PBC has had to buy large 
volumes of $US assets, principally U.S Treasury bonds, in order to maintain the peg. 
Consequently China’s reserve assets have swollen from $US169 billion at year-end 2000 
to $US619 billion at year-end 2004 (Table 2) and the RMB money supply has 
experienced rapid rates of increase (Table 1). To ameliorate the impact on the money 
supply, the PBC could have sterilized the purchases of $US assets by issuing an 
equivalent value of local currency denominated bonds. China’s underdeveloped domestic 
bond markets and regulated interest rates however limit the extent to which such bonds 
can be absorbed in practice1. The evidence suggests that roughly half of the increase in 
foreign reserves has filtered through to the domestic money supply. By continuing to 
support the dollar peg, the main fear is that the resultant monetary expansion has been 
fueling inflationary pressures and excessive fixed asset investment, particularly in 
speculative areas such as real estate.  Inflationary concerns were particularly high during 
2004 when the consumer price index (CPI) rose from –0.8 percent at the end of 2002 to 
5.3 percent by July 2004. The producer price index climbed even further topping 8 
percent.  Fears of a property bubble are also widely expressed in the official media and 
National Bureau of Statistics data shows average house prices increased by 14.4 percent 
in 2004 (considerably more in places like Shanghai), up from 3.8 percent in 2003. In light 
of these risks, the consensus position argues that China would be better served by a 
flexible exchange rate regime that frees monetary authorities up to tackle inflationary 
pressures by effecting interest rate adjustments in financial markets, as is done in most 
OECD countries.  
                                                 
1 Against the under-developed nature of China’s capital markets however is the fact that sterilization bonds 
issued by the PBC remain attractive to the large state banks. As Stephen Green from Standard Chartered 
Bank has observed, China’s regulators have given the state banks until January 2007 to meet the 8 percent 
capital adequacy ratio. Purchases of PBC sterilization bonds carry no capital requirement in contrast to 
loans to companies, which require a capital equivalent of 100 percent of the value of the loan.  
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Table 1. Selected economic data 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1. Real GDP growth (%) 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.5 8.3 9.3 9.5
Gross capital formation 
2. (% GDP) 
39.3 38.0 37.4 37.1 36.4 38.0 39.2 42.3 
3. Incremental capital-
output ratio (ie. 1 / 2) 
0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 
4. Money supply growth 
(%) 
25.3 20.7 14.9 14.7 12.3 15.0 19.4 19.7 14.8
5. Domestic credit 
growth (%) 
24.6 19.8 20.0 12.1 11.0 13.6 29.3 19.6 9.2
6. Fixed investment 
growth (%) 
14.8 8.8 13.9 5.1 10.3 13.0 16.9 27.7 25.8
Source – National Bureau of Statistics and the People’s Bank of China.  
 
 
Table 2. China’s foreign exchange reserves - sources of accumulation 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total reserves, inc. 
gold ($US billion) 
108 143 150 158 169 219 295 457 1 619
Total reserve 
accumulation, inc. 
gold (RES AC) ($US 
billion) 
32 36 6 9 11 50 77 162  207
Current account 
balance (CAS) ($US 
billion) 
7 37 31 21 21 17 35 46 70
Net FDI ($US billion) 38 42 41 37 37 37 47 47 61 2 
Net non-FDI 3 ($US 
billion) 
-13 -43 -66 -49 -47 -4 -5 69 77
GDP ($US billion) 821 903 954 999 1079 1176 1271 1412 1593
CAS (% GDP) 0.8 4.1 3.2 2.1 1.9 1.4 2.8 3.2 3.0
RES AC (% GDP) 3.9 4.0 0.6 0.9 1.0 4.3 6.1 11.5 3.9
Source – International Monetary Fund 
Notes – 
1. In 2003 the Chinese government used $US45 billion from its foreign reserves to recapitalize two state 
banks. As a result, the 2003 figure for total reserves is the official value plus $US 45 billion. The 2004 
figure is simply the official estimate. This has been done in keeping with Roubini and Setser (2005).  
2. The FDI figure for 2004 it is not a net figure. It is simply inward FDI. The source is the National Bureau 
of Statistics. In previous years, outward FDI recorded in the national accounts has been very small. 
3. Net non-FDI is calculated as the residual of the change in total reserve accumulation minus net FDI 
minus the current account balance.  
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While we concur with the consensus position that macroeconomic stability needs to be 
accorded the utmost importance given that it has underpinned China’s economic success 
during the reform period, we have numerous reservations regarding whether a flexible 
exchange rate regime would better achieve this outcome. We also point out that what we 
are discussing here is relatively large-scale regime change not simply tinkering around 
the edges. It is hard to see how China would be better off simply by effecting a small 
revaluation or introducing a slightly wider band within which the RMB could fluctuate. 
Indeed, these sorts of policies carry the distinct risk of serving to heighten speculative 
capital flows and reducing policy credibility. Thus, in our estimation, the choice China is 
currently facing is between maintaining the peg or adopting substantial exchange rate 
flexibility. 
 
Our first concern with abandoning the peg is that data simply do not suggest that flexible 
exchange rate regimes outperform fixed regimes in terms of macroeconomic stability. In 
fact, the data speak convincingly to the opposite effect. Deciding what type of exchange 
rate regime best promoted macroeconomic stability was a particularly topic issue during 
the 1990s. In an extensive study undertaken by IMF economists, Ghosh, et al. (1996), it 
was concluded -   
“Does the exchange rate regime matter for macroeconomic performance? 
The experience of IMF member countries since the 1960s suggests that it 
does. The strongest results concern inflation. Pegged exchange rates are 
associated with significantly better inflation performance (lower inflation 
and less variability), and there is at least some evidence of a causal 
relationship. There is, however, an important caveat. Countries that have 
frequent parity changes – while notionally maintaining a peg – are unlikely 
to reap the full anti-inflationary benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime” 
(p.12) 
 
Thus, not only does the data point to a better inflationary outcome under a fixed regime it 
also appears to lend support to China’s reluctance to undertake frequent 
revaluations/devaluations at the behest of fluctuations in sentiment regarding the 
equilibrium value of the RMB.  
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Xu (2000) showed that a striking long run correlation exists between movements in the 
domestic price level and the real exchange rate dating back to the start of the reform 
period. Xu interprets this relationship to be a bi-causal one. Before the adoption of a 
unified exchange rate in 1994, changes in the official exchange rate followed domestic 
price level fluctuations (i.e., inflationary episodes forced devaluations). Since 1994 when 
the official rate was allowed to depreciate to the prevailing market rate and by which time 
China’s global trade linkages had strengthened, stability in the exchange rate has helped 
to secure the domestic price level. Indeed, for all the talk of inflationary pressure in the 
consensus literature, it is odd that few have sought to seriously explain why actual 
inflation remains low. For Mundell and McKinnon, the answer is plain enough – the peg 
is doing its job in serving as a price anchor and is doing it very well. The price anchor 
role of the dollar peg is sometimes dismissed on the basis that bilateral trade with the U.S 
represents only a fraction of China’s total trade. But this misses the point made 
repeatedly by the likes of McKinnon that the overwhelming majority of trade within East 
Asia is invoiced in $US and that other countries in the region (with the notable exception 
of Japan) also either hard or soft peg to the dollar.  
 
Much of the recent shift in orthodoxy towards more flexible exchange rate regimes 
appears to have been motivated by the events of the Asian financial crisis as many of the 
affected economies operated either hard or soft dollar pegs. Yet this misses the bigger 
picture. The economies that experienced a relatively short period of crisis had earlier 
experienced long periods of macroeconomic stability and rapid economic growth and 
they returned to soft dollar pegging and strong growth once the crisis had passed 
(McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004). If China was looking for policy inspiration from its 
neighbors, the Japanese experience would be the one that stands out. After experiencing 
miraculous growth under a pegged exchange rate regime for three decades, political 
pressure from the U.S forced it to adopt a more flexible exchange rate in the early 1980s. 
A more flexible Yen however did nothing to promote macroeconomic stability or steel 
the Japanese economy against speculative activities and it continues to languish from the 
bursting of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  It would be a serious misreading of the 
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evidence to claim that the experience of East Asia shows that economic development is 
best served by flexible exchange rate regimes.   
 
The case for flexible exchange rate regimes also appears to have been given a boost by 
the contention that the sheer volume of highly mobile capital in today’s global economy 
means that fixed regimes are no longer viable. Sometimes this view is couched in the 
following terms - if speculators feel a currency is undervalued or overvalued, rightly or 
wrongly, it would be futile for a central bank to try and defend the currency. For Mundell 
(2003), this misses the point. Credibility is the key issue. Mundell points out that we do 
not see any speculative capital movements within countries as the exchange rate 
domestically is entirely credible. If a peg is credible, speculation will in fact be 
discouraged. Juxtaposed against countries such as Thailand during the Asian financial 
crisis, China’s has a huge stockpile of foreign exchange reserves and is running modest 
current account surpluses. China has also demonstrated a willingness to resist currency 
speculation in the past. During the Asian crisis the speculative bet was on an RMB 
devaluation. The peg however remained credible, capital flight slowed, monetary stability 
in East Asia was promoted and China’s economy continued to grow strongly, albeit a 
little off the boil. In the current environment of growing foreign exchange stockpiles and 
current account surpluses, credibility will only be lost if it becomes clear that maintaining 
the peg is costing the economy excessively in terms of macroeconomic stability. Despite 
inflationary fears surfacing in 2004 the annual rate of growth in the consumer price index 
has fallen from 3.9 percent at the end of 2004 to 1.8 percent in April 2005. Average real 
estate price growth is also heading in the right direction, falling from 14.4 percent at the 
end of 2004 to 12.5 percent in the first quarter of 2005. A policy package aimed at 
reducing property market speculation implemented in May 2005 is expected to further 
slow price growth in the future (China Daily, 13/05/2005). Secondly, while not 
committing to a flexible exchange rate regime, the Chinese government has taken steps to 
reduce the pressure on the growing foreign exchange reserve stockpile. For example, 
Chinese companies have been encouraged to invest abroad through the relaxing of rules 
that had previously restricted their ability to acquire foreign exchange. In 2005 Chinese 
companies will be permitted to invest a combined $US5 billion abroad, up from $US3.3 
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billion the year before (IHT, 24/05/2005). Rules allowing individuals to buy foreign 
exchange have also been loosened. While these numbers are quite small relative to the 
size of the increase in China’s foreign currency reserves, such policy actions nonetheless 
play an important signaling role to speculators. Thirdly, the threat of blanket U.S trade 
sanctions against China is not credible as it is not an approach with broad support 
amongst U.S industry bodies, and in any case would be in violation of WTO rules.  
 
A second weakness we see in the consensus literature is that it appears to eschew 
identifying proximate problems and policy responses. In focusing on inflows of foreign 
capital and increases in foreign exchange reserves, it misdiagnoses the causes of 
inflationary pressure and speculative investment in recent years. HSBC (2005) points out 
that total foreign capital inflows (FDI and short-term capital) in 2004 were only equal to 
around 20 percent of the total value of fixed asset investment. If dampening inflationary 
pressure and slowing the rate of fixed asset investment is the goal, domestic credit is the 
most obvious place to start. And even if one does conclude that foreign capital inflows 
are a significant part of the problem, then an appropriate response would center on 
reducing the volume of hot money entering the country and bolstering the prudential 
regulation of the banking sector. The key lesson to emerge from the Japanese experience 
is the importance of having a strong banking sector, not having a particular type of 
exchange rate regime. When looking into cross-country performance under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes, IMF economists Caramazza and Aziz (1998) concluded 
that – 
“The analysis suggests that exchange rate regimes cannot be unambiguously 
rated in terms of economic performance. But it seems clear that, whatever 
the exchange rate regime a country chooses, long term success depends 
upon a commitment to sound economic fundamentals – and a strong 
banking sector.” 
 
Our third major critique of the consensus view is that it appears not to exhibit a consistent 
take on current Chinese institutional realities. On the one hand, it does note that China’s 
domestic financial markets limit the extent to which effective sterilization activities can 
be performed by the PBC. Yet on the other hand, it calls upon the PBC to use these same 
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financial markets to target inflation through open market operations. Monetary authorities 
in OECD countries target inflation by effecting interest rate adjustments in diverse and 
liquid financial markets with market determined interest rates. Such institutional 
conditions are a far cry from the segmented, heavily regulated and shallow bonds markets 
in China that authors such as Bottelier (2003) describe. Furthermore, the most prominent 
group of borrowers in China’s banking system, the state-owned enterprises, are not 
particularly sensitive to interest rate changes as long as their budget constraint remains 
soft (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003). The success of inflation-targeting in OECD 
economies over the past couple of decades is of limited relevance for China. The reality 
is that the monetary transmission channel used by OECD countries is much weaker and 
less predictable in China. It is for this very reason that historically when the PBC has 
sought to rein in inflation, it has done so primarily through administrative measures such 
as formal and informal limits on domestic credit growth (often by economic sector) and 
by adjusting the required reserve ratio for financial institutions. This continued to be the 
case through 2004 when rising inflation was met with such a policy package. Later in 
2004 when the PBC also marginally raised interest rates (by 0.27 percent) the volume of 
subsequent commentary in financial publications was out of all proportion to the size of 
the increase simply because it was the first time the PBC had done so in nearly a decade. 
One should not discount the effectiveness of administrative controls in the Chinese 
context where the state-owned banks remain dominant. When combined with partial 
sterilization, the administrative measures put in place last year caused the growth rate in 
domestic credit to fall from 19.6 percent in 2003 to 9.2 percent in 2004 (Table 1). World 
Bank (2005) observes that at end-March 2005, the growth rate in the money supply (M2) 
had slowed to 14.6 percent (down from 19.6 percent in 2003) and was once again within 
the target range of the monetary authorities. The rate of growth in fixed asset investment 
remains high (25.7 percent through April 2005) but HSBC (2005) points out that there is 
usually a lag of more than 12 months before tighter domestic credit filters through to 
construction investment.  
 
Another institutional reality that makes moving to a more flexible exchange rate regime 
difficult is an absence of financial markets that perform hedging operations. While 
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bankers and traders in OECD economies have ready access to instruments such as 
exchange rate futures, in developing countries these agents rely on a stable exchange rate. 
A potential problem with using a pegged exchange rate as a hedge, and one that received 
much airplay in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, is the fear that it might worsen 
moral hazard amongst domestic banks and encourage them to over-borrow in foreign 
currency.  However, again, the key issue is banking sector regulation, not exchange rate 
policy. McKinnon and Schnabl (2004, p.341) also point out that -   
"Against this however is the view that the risk premium in domestic interest 
rates is a direct function of how stable the domestic currency is relative to 
the center currency (i.e., the dollar). Thus, if the domestic exchange rate 
against the dollar varies erratically in a free float, domestic interest rates will 
be higher and so will the margin of temptation to overborrow in foreign 
exchange. In summary, one cannot say a priori whether or not soft pegging 
aggravates the moral hazard in badly regulated banks to overborrow".  
 
A final concern we have regarding a more flexible RMB has to do with the implications 
increased volatility would have on the relationship between the mainland and Hong Kong 
- the showcase of the one country, two systems approach and an autonomous region that 
also operates a hard peg to the dollar. Hong Kong is the classic textbook example of a 
small, open country that benefits from a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis its trading partners 
Hong Kong’s trade is more than two and a half times the size of its GDP. According to 
Hong Kong trade statistics, in 2004 total trade (direct and entrepôt) with the mainland 
accounted for 43.7 percent of its total, followed by trade with the U.S at 11 percent. It is 
often asserted that because China’s exports have a high imported component, an RMB 
appreciation would only marginally impact on export growth. Yet given the dependence 
of Hong Kong on trade with the mainland even a modest appreciation could have a 
significant impact on the much smaller, more trade dependent economy. Hong Kong has 
also been by far the largest "foreign" investor in the mainland with the Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council claiming that at the end of 2004, 47 percent of overseas registered 
projects on the mainland had Hong Kong connections. While the consensus literature 
tends to cite econometric studies which suggest that on average FDI and exchange rate 
fluctuations are only weakly related, authors such as Mundell (2003) and McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2003) prefer to point out case studies closer to home that may well be 
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considered more pertinent by China’s policy makers. Japanese FDI into many other East 
Asian countries, for example, has tended to closely follow trend movements in the 
Yen/Dollar exchange rate.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper first sought to expose some of the common myths surrounding China’s 
exchange rate policy. It is far from obvious that the RMB is undervalued and given the 
variation in equilibrium estimates offered by economists, the reluctance of Chinese policy 
makers to significantly revalue the RMB is understandable. And even if the RMB were 
undervalued, there is no convincing reason to think that an appreciation would have any 
meaningful impact on the U.S trade and current account position. The paper then sought 
to provide a critique of the increasingly popular view that China should abandon the peg 
and move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime. Our basic view is that many of 
the benefits currently accruing to China as a result of the peg are not sufficiently 
recognized (e.g., the price anchor role of the peg) and similarly the costs involved in 
moving to a more flexible regime (e.g., current institutional constraints). Perhaps the 
most prominent shortcoming of the consensus literature is that it fails to convincingly 
demonstrate how the problems in China’s economy today (e.g., inflationary pressure, 
excessive fixed asset investment) will be best addressed by abandoning the peg and 
adopting a more flexible regime. Proximate policy responses would center on restraining 
the growth in domestic credit, reducing the volume of hot money entering the country 
and bolstering the prudential regulation of banks. All of these can be done, and indeed are 
being done to a greater or lesser extent, within the context of the pegged exchange rate 
regime that has served China well.   
 
China’s economic performance over the past decade suggests that it has not been 
hopelessly trying to reconcile the "irreconcilable trilemma" from macroeconomic theory, 
which states that a country cannot simultaneously pursue free capital mobility, a fixed 
exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. While its capital controls are 
certainly porous to a degree, when combined with partial sterilization and administrative 
controls over banks they have nonetheless been sufficient to allow China to maintain both 
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macroeconomic stability and a pegged exchange rate. China is also fortunate in the sense 
that its high savings rate, cheap labor force and attractive domestic market means that it 
does not face the same opportunity cost other developing countries might when retaining 
capital controls (Laurenceson, 2005). It is worthwhile briefly elaborating on this point. 
The usual argument underlying the position that even developing countries are best 
served by flexible exchange rates is that it will allow them to use an independent 
monetary policy to maintain macroeconomic stability while removing capital controls, 
with the assumption being that the benefits of access to foreign capital (e.g., funding for 
investment, technology and expertise, consumption smoothing, etc.) more than outweigh 
the costs of abandoning the fixed exchange rate. But with a savings to GDP ratio 
consistently around 40 percent, China already has ample savings to fund investment. The 
problem for the domestic financial sector has always been one of using existing savings 
more efficiently rather than the need to mobilize more. Also, it is incorrect to say that 
China has not liberalized capital controls. In fact, restrictions over FDI have been 
gradually liberalized to the extent that China now receives more FDI than any other 
country in the world. Consequently, the opportunity cost to China of maintaining 
exchange rate stability is foregoing access to more non-FDI capital (that in aggregate it 
does not really need anyway) and the chance for domestic savers to earn higher returns 
abroad. Given that macroeconomic stability, foreign trade and FDI have underpinned the 
rapid growth in living standards during the reform period, forgoing the opportunities of 
higher returns abroad is likely to be considered an acceptable sacrifice by the average 
Chinese saver.  
 
There is one factor that may push the balance in favor of China adopting a more flexible 
exchange rate regime, even in the short to medium term. Some of the benefit China 
currently derives from the dollar peg flows from the fact that other countries in the region 
also peg to the dollar. Japan is the sole exception with any economic weight. For Mundell 
and McKinnon, the first best scenario would be for Japan to return to dollar pegging. 
Political considerations however make this virtually unthinkable. Thus, if the Yen does 
for whatever reason fluctuate markedly against the dollar and / or if political pressure on 
other East Asian countries forces their currencies to fluctuate, a new cost-benefit analysis 
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will need to be undertaken by China’s policy makers regarding their optimal response. In 
the longer term, moving to a managed float may pass the cost-benefit test, irrespective of 
the exchange rate policies of its neighbors. Once China’s own institutional environment 
has been bolstered, a managed float becomes more appealing. Still, based on what we 
know about the economy at this point in time and the lessons learned from other 
countries, the area most urgently in need of policy attention is domestic financial reform - 
strengthening prudential regulation, shoring up the capital base of the banks, resolving 
ownership ambiguities, instituting effective corporate governance structures and building 
more complete, unfettered, liquid and transparent direct financial markets.  
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